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Freedom of Expression and Adult Entertainment:
The Naked Truth
INTRODUCTION
Government officials have traditionally attempted to regulate
adult entertainment in a variety of ways. This comment discusses
regulations affecting rights guaranteed by the First Amendment
and illustrates how these regulations can constitutionally coincide
with the First Amendment.! It asserts that both lawyers and mu-
nicipal officers need to be more aware of the First Amendment
issues that may arise when adult entertainment regulations are
proposed and subsequently enacted.
Part I of this comment distinguishes between obscenity, which is
not afforded protection by the First Amendment, and other forms
of adult entertainment, which are deemed protected expression.
Part II analyzes common methods that state and local govern-
ments have used to ban adult entertainment. In doing so, it exam-
ines both licensing regulations and zoning ordinances and dis-
cusses how these may violate the First Amendment. Finally, Part
III identifies potential First Amendment issues and provides advice
to both lawyers and municipal officers involved in drafting restric-
tive legislation. Specifically, it suggests that drafters of adult enter-
tainment licensing regulations impose adequate standards to guide
officials in their decision-maling capacity. In addition, the licens-
ing regulations should impose procedural safeguards sufficient to
ensure a prompt decision. It also recommends that proposed zon-
ing ordinances, enacted to regulate adult entertainment, be aimed
at serving a substantial governmental interest, namely the exis-
tence of harmful secondary effects.
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 37:103
I. OBSCENITY V. ADULT ENTERTAINMENT
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Gov-
ernment for a redress of grievances."2 The rights this amendment
embraces are often grouped together under the rubric of "freedom
of expression." Although First Amendment rights enjoy a great
degree of protection, they are not absolute.
The government may punish an individual for utterances that
cause results so undesirable they outweigh the value of freedom of
expression. For example, disclosure of U.S. intelligence operations
and names of intelligence personnel for the purpose of obstructing
intelligence operations is clearly not protected speech.' It is often
stated that the most stringent protection of free speech would not
allow a person to falsely shout "fire!" in a crowded theater.4 Courts
have held some verbal and visual expression to be obscene and
outside the protection of the First Amendment.
Obscenity, like fighting words and defamation, has been a form
of expression unprotected by the First Amendment.' The Supreme
Court has determined that obscenity has so little social value that
the societal interest in order and morality outweighs any interest in
protecting obscene material. Thus, the Court has characterized
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981). The Court upheld the revocation of Agee's
passport because he engaged in activities abroad that caused serious damage to the
national security. Haig, 453 U.S. at 280-81. Specifically, Agee, a former employee of the
Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"), engaged in a campaign to expose CIA officers and
agents and to take the measures necessary to drive them out of the countries where they
were operating. Id.
4. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). In Schenck, the defendants
were convicted of conspiracy to violate § 3 of the Espionage Act of 1917 by circulating,
to men who had been called and accepted for military service, a document alleged to be
aimed at obstructing the recruiting and enlistment process. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49.
5. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In Chaplinsky, Chaplinsky was arrested while distributing
Jehovah's Witnesses literature on the street and denouncing all religion as a "racket."
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569-70. Justice Murphy, speaking for the Court, upheld the con-
viction, stating that these words were intended to inflict harm rather than to communi-
cate ideas and, therefore, were not really "speech" at all. Id. at 573. The Court further
held that the words were not protected by the First Amendment because they were
likely to provoke the average person to retaliate and, thereby, to cause a breach of
peace. Id. In New York Times, a decision authored by Justice Brennan, the Supreme
Court held that the First Amendment does not protect defamatory expression in actions
brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct, absent proof of actual
malice. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
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obscene materials as unprotected speech.' Pursuant to the United
States Constitution, local governments may ban obscenity, includ-
ing any and all obscene forms of adult entertainment.7
The difficulty with adult entertainment, however, is that it often
does not rise to the level of obscenity. Non-obscene printed mat-
ter, films, and live entertainment--even if erotic-are meant to be
sheltered by the First Amendment.' In other words, sexual expres-
sion that is indecent but not obscene is protected expression un-
der the First Amendment.
In 1973, in the landmark decision of Miller v. California,' the
Supreme Court announced the current standard for distinguishing
6. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957). Justice Brennan, on behalf of
the Supreme Court, held that (1) a federal obscenity statute making punishable the mail-
ing of material that is obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy or of other publications of an
indecent character and (2) a California obscenity statute making punishable, inter alia,
the keeping for sale or advertising of material that is obscene or indecent do not offend
constitutional safeguards against convictions based on protected material. Id. at 491-92.
7. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); See infra pp. 7-9.
8. Several forms of "adult entertainment" have been found not to rise to the level of
obscenity, such as:
(1) ADULT BOOKSTORE: An establishment having as a substantial or sig-
nificant portion of its stock in trade books, magazines, other periodicals,
or any tangible items and objects, not necessarily of a reading or photo-
graphic nature, which are distinguished or characterized by their empha-
sis on matter depicting, describing or relating to specified sexual activi-
ties or specified anatomical areas, as defined below, or an establishment
with a segment or section devoted to the sale or display of such material.
(2) ADULT MOTION PICTURE THEATER: An enclosed building with a ca-
pacity of fifty (50) or more persons used for presenting material distin-
guished or characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing
or relating to specified sexual activities or specified anatomical area, as
defined below, for observation by patrons within. (3) ADULT MINI
MOTION PICTURE THEATER: An enclosed building with a capacity for
less than fifty (50) persons used for presenting material distinguished or
characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating
to specified sexual activities or specified anatomical areas, as defined be-
low, for observation by patrons within. (a) For the purpose of these de-
scriptions, "specified sexual activities" can be defined as human genitals
in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal; acts of human masturbation,
sexual intercourse or sodomy; and fondling or other erotic touching of
human genitals, pubic region, buttock or female breast; and "specified
anatomical areas" can be defined as less than completely and opaquely
covered human genitals, pubic region, buttock or female breast below a
point immediately above the top of the areola; and human male genitals in
a discernibly turgid state, even if completely and opaquely covered. (4)
CABARET: An establishment which features go-go dancers, exotic danc-
ers, strippers, or similar entertainers.
Phillips v. Borough of Keyport, 107 F.3d 164, 170 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Ordinance No.
31-92, Borough of Keyport, codified at KEYPORT, N.J., REV. GEN. CODE, ch. XXV, § 25:1-
3(a)(1992)).
9. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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between protected expression and illegal obscenity."° The Court
held that if (1) the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, ap-
peals to the prurient interest; (2) the work depicts or describes, in
a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law; and (3) the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, then the work
constitutes illegal obscenity and does not warrant constitutional
protection." The practical result of the Miller test has been to nar-
rowly define the category of materials subject to prohibition, such
that the definition encompasses only "hard-core" sexual expres-
sion.1
2
States encountered difficulties in applying the Miller standard to
distinguish between soft- and hard-core pornography. This be-
came evident in Jenkins v. Georgia,'4 in which the Court unani-
mously reversed the obscenity conviction of a movie theater
owner who had shown the motion picture "Carnal Knowledge."
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, reemphasized that, under
Miller, only the most explicit, hard-core materials, lacking any re-
deeming value whatsoever, would suffer constitutional proscrip-
tion.'6 As a result, only a small portion of the broad range of porno-
graphic materials available to the public could successfully be
regulated under the obscenity law as set forth in Jenkins. How-
ever, the courts have had little trouble characterizing certain types
of adult entertainment material as obscene, such as those materi-
als depicting flagellation,'" bestiality,'" sadomasochism, and ex-
10. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160 (1974). In Jenkins, the defendant
was convicted of distributing obscene materials in violation of Georgia obscenity law.
Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 154. The material in question was a film that included scenes in
which sexual conduct, including "ultimate sexual acts" was to be understood to be tak-
ing place, and that included occasional scenes of nudity but in which the camera did not
focus on the actors' bodies or on any parts thereof during such scenes. Id. at 161. Jus-
tice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court, reversed the conviction, finding that the-film did
not depict sexual conduct in a patently offensive way and was not obscene under "cur-
rently operative constitutional standards." Id. at 155.
13. Id.
14. 418 U.S. 153.
15. Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 155. The Georgia Supreme Court upheld Jenkins' conviction
in Jenkins v. State, 230 Ga. 726, 199 S.E.2d 183 (1973). Id.
16. Id. at 153.
17. See, e.g., Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 771-72 (1977). Justice White, writing for
the Supreme Court, held that sadomasochistic materials were the kind of materials that
may be proscribed by state law, even though they were not expressly included in the
106 Vol. 37:103
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treme violence. 9
Although obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment, the
Supreme Court has held that laws relating to sexually explicit ma-
terial and other forms of speech must be sensitive to the First
Amendment rights otherwise involved." In Roaden v. Kentucky,2
the Court held that the setting of an adult book store or commer-
cial theater is presumptively protected by the First Amendment.22
Then, in Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim,' the Court stated that
entertainment, as well as political and ideological speech, is consti-
tutionally protected.24 The Court continued, "motion pictures, pro-
grams broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment,
such as musical and dramatic works, fall within the First Amend-
ment guarantee." 5 The Court also stated, in Schad, that an enter-
tainment program could not be prohibited solely because it dis-
plays the nude human figure.2" Moreover, the Court has repeatedly
found that "[nludity alone does not place otherwise protected ma-
terial outside the mantle of First Amendment protection."27
examples of sexually explicit representations set forth in Miller to define obscenity.
Ward, 431 U.S. at 771-72. The term "flagellation" is defined as "a beating or whipping; a
flogging; especially as religious discipline or in abnormal eroticism." WEBSTER'S NEW
UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 695 (2d ed. 1983).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Guglielmi, 819 F.2d 451, 453-54 (4th Cir. 1987). The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the "prurient interest" branch of the
test for obscenity did not require a finding that the average person would experience
sexual arousal in viewing a film to deem obscene films depicting bestiality. Guglielmi,
819 F.2d at 453-54. The Court also opined that the finding of obscenity with respect to
films depicting bestiality did not necessitate a finding of appeal to the "average zoophil-
iac." Id.
19. See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 123 (1974). In Hamling, the Court
upheld the conviction for mailing and conspiring to mall an obscene brochure advertis-
ing an illustrated version of a report from the Presidential Commission on Obscenity and
Pornography; See also Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959). Justice Brennan
reversed an obscenity conviction due to the fact that the ordinance under which the
defendant was charged dispensed with the element of scienter, thereby imposing strict
criminal liability on bookseller possessing obscene material. Smith, 361 at 155.
20. See, e.g., Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973); Schad v. Borough of Mt.
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
21. 413 U.S. 496 (1973).
22. Roaden, 413 U.S. at 504.
23. 452 U.S. 61 (1981). The Court struck down a zoning ordinance that prohibited
live entertainment, including nude dancing. Schad, 452 U.S. at 65. Because the ordi-
nance effected a total ban on all live entertainment, it impermissibly prohibited a wide
range of expression that has long been held to be within the protections of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
24. Schad, 452 U.S. at 65.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 66.
27. See, e.g., Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 161; Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420
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The Supreme Court has consistently held that nude dancing is
expressive conduct and, as such, is protected by the First Amend-
ment.28 Although the Supreme Court has indicated that nude danc-
ing may approach the outer perimeter of First Amendment protec-
tion, it is nonetheless clear that all regulations regarding nude
dancing must be examined using First Amendment criteria.
Over the years, government officials have attempted to regulate
adult entertainment uses in a variety of ways. Specifically, state
and local officials have frequently mandated that businesses or
individuals involved in the adult entertainment industry obtain
special permits or licenses.29 They have also enacted zoning ordi-
nances that disperse the adult uses throughout the municipality or,
alternatively, concentrate them in one area2 0O However, because of
such officials' careless and/or negligent drafting of licensing regu-
lations and zoning ordinances, courts have struck down many of
these laws as unconstitutional. The purpose of the remainder of
this comment is to identify typical problems presented by ordi-
nances and laws that seek to regulate adult entertainment and to
propose ways for lawyers and municipal officers to enact adult
entertainment regulations that do not offend the First Amendment.
U.S. 546 (1975); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1975).
28. See, e.g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 982 (1975); Schad, 452 U.S. at 61;
Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). In Doran, owners of three topless bars
sought a temporary injunction from a North Hempstead, New York, town ordinance that
prohibited topless dancing in any public place. Doran, 422 U.S. at 924. Justice
Rehnquist wrote that "although the customary barroom type of nude dancing may in-
volve only the barest minimum of protected expression, this form of entertainment
might be entitled to First Amendment protection in some circumstances." Id. at 932. In
both Schad and Barnes, the Supreme Court followed the Doran Court, concluding that
nude dancing is not without First Amendment protections from official regulation.
Schad, 452 U.S. at 66; Barnes, 501 U.S. at 565-66.
29. See, e.g., Dease v. City of Anaheim, 826 F. Supp. 336, 342 (C.D. Cal. 1993), infra
note 34; Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-60 (1965), infra note 39.
30. See, e.g., Grand Brittain, Inc. v. City of Amarillo, 27 F.3d 1068 (5th Cir. 1994)
(adult book store brought action challenging city ordinance and Fifth Circuit held that
city was required to maintain status quo, during licensing proceedings, for businesses
that were operating when the ordinance became effective but that other portions of the
ordinances were constitutional); City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41
(1986), infra note 85.
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II. REGULATION OF ADULT ENTERTAINMENT
A. Licensing Regulations
Licensing is a method that states regularly employ to regulate
adult entertainment. The state may generally impose license re-
quirements on legitimate businesses for purposes of promoting the
public health, morals, safety, or welfare.' However, when license
requirements are imposed only on specific businesses, such as
sexually-oriented businesses, which disseminate a certain type of
speech, at least some of which may be protected by the First
Amendment, serious questions as to the validity of the licensing
requirement may arise.32 To satisfy constitutional requirements, a
licensing regulation must meet two tests: it must impose adequate
standards; and it must impose procedural safeguards.'
1. Adequate Standards
A constitutional licensing regulation must impose adequate
standards for officials to apply in rendering a decision as to
whether to grant, deny, or revoke an operational license. In par-
ticular, any such regulation must contain narrow, well-defined,
objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority.
Municipalities do not always satisfy this requirement. For example,
in Dease v. City of Anaheim,' proprietors of adult businesses
challenged the validity of the City of Anaheim's conditional use
permit ordinance that applied to adult businesses.35 Under the chal-
lenged ordinance, a permit could be denied if (1) the planning
31. This is known as the "police power" of a state or municipality. It is defined as:
An authority conferred by the American constitutional system in the Tenth
Amendment, U.S. Const., on the individual states, and, in turn, delegated
to local governments, through which they are enabled to establish a spe-
cial department of police; adopt such laws and regulations as tend to pre-
vent the commission of fraud and crime, and secure generally the comfort,
safety, morals, health, and prosperity of its citizens by preserving the pub-
lic order, preventing a conflict of rights in the common intercourse of the
citizens, and insuring to each an uninterrupted enjoyment of all the privi-
leges conferred on him or her by the general laws.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1156 (6th ed. 1990).
32. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), infra note
65; Renton, 475 U.S. at 48, infra note 85.
33. Dease v. City of Anaheim, 826 F. Supp. 336, 342 (C.D. Cal. 1993); Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-60 (1965).
34. 826 F. Supp. 336 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
35. Dease, 826 F. Supp. at 342.
1998
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commission found that the adult business would "adversely affect"
the use of a church, school, park, or playground; (2) the adult
business was "insufficiently buffered" in relation to residential ar-
eas; or (3) the exterior appearance of the business was "inconsis-
tent" with the appearance of external structures in the neighbor-
hood.'
The district court concluded that the permit scheme was invalid,
basing its decision on the fact that the planning commission was
vested with unconstitutionally broad discretion to decide whether
to grant or deny the permit.37 The court held that the Anaheim
Planning Commission's decision-making process was not guided
by definite and objective standards, leaving open the possibility of
content-based discrimination.' This litigation may have been
avoided if the drafters of the ordinance had given more careful
consideration to the First Amendment rights of owners of adult
businesses.
2. Procedural Safeguards
The second test for determining the constitutionality of a licens-
ing regulation is whether it imposes procedural safeguards suffi-
cient to ensure a prompt decision. The Supreme Court, in Freed-
man v. Maryland,' identified the following three procedural safe-
guards that guarantee a decision is rendered promptly, specifically:
(1) any restraint imposed prior to judicial review could be imposed
only for a specified brief period during which the status quo must
be maintained; (2) expeditious judicial review of that decision
must be made available; and, (3) the government must bear both
the burden of going to court to suppress the speech and the bur-
den of proof in court.'° If the licensing statute in question fails to
provide these procedural safeguards, it will be found unconstitu-
tional.41
It is well-settled that, in the area of free expression, a licensing
statute placing "unbridled discretion" in the hands of a government
official or agency constitutes a prior restraint and may result in
36. Id. at 340. (citing ANAHEIM, FLA., MUN. CODE §18.03.030).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 345.
39. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
40. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-60.
41. Id.
Vol. 37:103
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unconstitutional censorship." In FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,
the Supreme Court indicated that allowing government officials to
exercise unbridled discretion in determining whether to prohibit
protected speech, as a matter of policy, presented an unacceptable
risk of both indefinitely suppressing and chilling protected
speech.'
In FW/PBS, an ordinance regulating sexually-oriented businesses
was intended to "eradicat[e] the secondary effects of crime and
urban blight."5 The Court held that the ordinance lacked the nec-
essary procedural safeguards because it failed to set time limits on
the inspections required prior to the issuance of a license to the
sexually-oriented businesses." According to the Court, absent the
constraint of specific standards to guide decision makers in de-
termining whether a license should be issued, an impermissible
danger existed because government officials may either inconsis-
tently suppress speech or have unlimited latitude in determining
whether the license should be issued.7 In addition, applicants may
feel compelled to censor their own speech because of the lack of
definite limitations on time.' The Court noted that a licensing
scheme that allowed indefinite postponement of the issuance of a
license created the possibility that constitutionally-protected
42. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 225-26 (1990); Freedman, 380 U.S. at
51.
43. 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
44. FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 223-24.
45. Id. at 220. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
held that the ordinance was not violative of the First and Fourth Amendments, in Du-
mas v. DaUas, 648 F. Supp. 1061 (N.D. Tex. 1986). The petitioners appealed the District
Court's decision to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the deci-
sion. FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 837 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir. 1988).
46. Id. at 223.
47. Id. at 226-27.
48. Id. at 226. The licensing scheme contained in a comprehensive city ordinance
that regulated sexually-oriented businesses-defined as adult arcades, adult bookstores,
adult video stores, adult cabarets, adult motels, adult motion picture theaters, adult
theaters, escort agencies, nude model studios, or sexual encounter centers-was found
to violate the Constitution. Id. at 224. This licensing scheme was unconstitutional be-
cause it was enforced against businesses engaged in activity protected by the First
Amendment and because the ordinance provides that the chief of police shall approve
the issuance of a license to a sexually-oriented business within thirty days after the
receipt of an application but ddes not require a license to be issued if the premises to be
used for the business have not been approved by the health department, fire department,
and the building official as being in compliance with the applicable laws and ordinances
and does not set a time limit within which the inspections must occur. Id. at 226-27.
Such a scheme is unconstitutional because it allows indefinite postponement of the
issuance of a license and falls to provide an avenue for prompt judicial review so as to
minimize suppression of protected speech in the event of a license denial. Id.
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speech would be suppressed.49 The Court, in FW/PBS, concluded
that, without procedural safeguards in place to ensure a prompt
resolution, such licensing schemes might convince an applicant
that seeking a determination was too burdensome to pursue,
thereby, impermissibly chilling protected speech as a result of the
potential for indefinite postponement.'
Adult entertainment licensing regulations can be constitutionally
enacted, provided they comply with the above-mentioned guide-
lines. The regulations must impose adequate standards to guide
officials in making licensing decisions. In addition, the regulations
must impose procedural safeguards sufficient to ensure a prompt
decision. The drafters of the licensing regulation in FW/PBS did
not comply with the constitutional guidelines set forth in Freed-
man. Rather, they gave the chief of police unbridled discretion to
grant or withhold the license.5' Furthermore, the regulations failed
to set forth a time limit for the rendering of the licensing decision.2
Drafters of regulations, as well as attorneys, must conform to the
guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court, so as not to run afoul of
the First Amendment.
Licensing regulations are just one method by which state and
local municipalities attempt to regulate adult entertainment. Zon-
ing ordinances, aimed at restricting adult entertainment establish-
ments, have also been proposed and enacted. Like many licensing
regulations, they have often been struck down when they uncon-
stitutionally infringe on protected expression.
B. Zoning Ordinances
Zoning ordinances that exclude places of entertainment from
specified zones have generally been upheld by the courts. The Su-
preme Court firmly established this broad zoning power in Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.' Pursuant to that decision, munici-
palities were given the power to protect the public health, safety,
morals, and welfare of their residents by restricting the permissible
uses of land.' Since Euclid, zoning has developed into a powerful
49. FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 226-27.
50. Id at 227.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
54. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 365. The Supreme Court acknowledged that zoning consti-
tutes a legitimate function of the state police power. Id. at 387-88. A court must con-
Vol. 37:103
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tool for controlling and shaping urban life and has become a major
weapon in communities' attempts to regulate businesses offering
sexually explicit materials. Zoning now affects much more than
the location of undesirable land uses. It preserves historical land-
marks, encourages development, and deters disorderly growth.
However, when the land use in question is a sexually-oriented
business, such as an "X-rated" movie theater, adult bookstore, or
establishment offering nude entertainment, the municipality's zon-
ing power is limited because the regulation may encroach on the
freedom of expression. Similar to the above-discussed licensing
regulations, many localities shape zoning schemes to the demise of
the commercial potential and strength of the adult entertainment
businesses." Both lawyers and municipal officials must understand
how these zoning ordinances can impinge on the First Amend-
ment, so that they can propose and enact ordinances that do not
violate the United States Constitution.
One of the ways zoning ordinances can violate the Constitution
is by restricting expression on the basis of the content of that ex-
pression. Such restrictions are classified as "content-based" laws.
Presumptively unconstitutional, content-based laws must advance
a compelling governmental interest using the least restrictive
means if they are to comply with the Constitution.' As Justice
Marshall, writing for the Court, recognized in Police Department of
Chicago v. Mosley,57 "above all else, the First Amendment means
that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. ' When the
government action is content based, the courts will apply strict
scrutiny and invalidate any restriction that is not narrowly tailored
sider a city's zoning scheme in the context of all of the surrounding circumstances and
conditions. Id. at 388. The court will defer to the city's judgment in this area, unless the
zoning scheme was "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." Id. at 395.
55. Gianni P. Servodidio, The Devaluation of Nonobscene Eroticism as a Form of
Expression Protected by the First Amendment, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1231, 1236 (1993).
56. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951). Chief Justice Vinson held that a New
York City ordinance, making it unlawful to hold public worship meetings on the streets
without first obtaining a permit from the city police commissioner, was invalid because
it vested control over the right to speak on religious subjects in an administrative official
without providing appropriate standards to guide his actions. Kunz, 340 U.S. at 293.
57. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
58. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95. Justice Marshall held that a city ordinance prohibiting all
picketing within 150 feet of a school, except peaceful picketing of any school involved in
a labor dispute, was unconstitutional because it made an impermissible distinction be-
tween peaceful labor picketing and other peaceful picketing. Id. at 94-95.
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to serve a compelling state interest.9
Laws that restrict freedom of expression without regard to the
content of the speech are referred to as "content-neutral" laws.
Content-neutral laws are typically justified by their prevention of
harmful secondary effects and, as such, are required to satisfy a
less exacting constitutional standard." They must be narrowly tai-
lored to serve a substantial governmental interest and must leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of informa-
tion.
61
When presented with content-based zoning regulations, courts
have generally applied a strict scrutiny standard of review and
found such regulations to violate the First Amendment, unless the
localities involved could establish the existence of harmful secon-
dary effects caused by such expression. 2 "Regulations that permit
the government to discriminate on the basis of the content of the
message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment."' In
contrast, when presented with content-neutral zoning ordinances
restricting the location of adult businesses under the First
Amendment, courts have been required to decide what evidence is
sufficient to establish a "substantial" government interest in re-
stricting the location of adult businesses.' Proving the existence of
a "substantial" governmental interest is a relatively easy burden for
59. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). Chief Justice Warren held
that a sufficient governmental interest was shown to justify the defendant's conviction,
despite his claim that his act was protected as "symbolic speech." Id. at 367. This
speech was not protected because the government had a substantial interest in ensuring
the continuing availability of issued selective service certificates, because the statute
punishing knowing destruction or mutilation of such certificates was an appropriately
narrow means of protecting such interest and condemned only the independent non-
communicative impact of conduct within its reach, and because the noncommunicative
impact of defendant's act of burning his registration certificate frustrated the govern-
ment's interest. Id. at 381-82.
60. See, e.g., Young, infra note 65; Renton, infra note 85.
61. See, e.g., Young, infra note 65; Renton, infra note 85.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (the Flag Burning Act was
subject to most exacting scrutiny and could not be upheld under the First Amendment);
See also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (the state could not justify prosecution of
a defendant based on its interest in preventing breaches of peace or in preserving the
flag as symbol of nationhood and national unity).
63. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984). In Regan, a publisher brought
an action challenging the constitutionality of statutes governing the publication or pro-
duction of illustrations of federal currency. Id. at 643. Justice White, on behalf of the
Supreme Court, held that the statute's purpose requirement discriminated on the basis
of content in violation of the First Amendment but that the statute's size and color re-
quirements were valid as reasonable manner regulations. Id. at 648-49, 658-59.
64. See, e.g., Young, infra note 65; Renton, infra note 85.
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the government to overcome, whereas proving the existence of a
"compelling" governmental interest is much more difficult. There-
fore, in the realm of adult entertainment, courts have upheld both
content-based and content-neutral zoning regulations when such
regulations were justified by the adverse secondary effects caused
by the "speech." The distinguishing factor between content-based
and content-neutral regulations is the degree of governmental in-
terest required by the Constitution. As the remainder of this com-
ment shows, the "secondary effects" doctrine has spawned zealous
debate within the judicial system.
1. Avoidance of Harmful Secondary Effects as a Substantial
Governmental Interest
In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,65 a plurality of the
Court opined that it was constitutionally permissible to distinguish
between "adult" or sexually explicit speech and other categories of
speech in a zoning ordinance imposing locational restrictions on
adult businesses.' The plurality opinion conceded that the ordi-
nances treated adult theaters differently, based on the content of
the material shown in the respective theaters.67 The pluarilty opin-
ion of the Court determined that the ordinance in question in
Young had neither the intent nor the effect of suppressing speech
but, instead, was aimed at the secondary effects caused by adult
businesses on surrounding uses and, as such, was not an invalid
prior restraint on protected expression.'
In Young, the City of Detroit amended its "Anti-Skid Row Ordi-
nance" to impose zoning limitations on adult businesses.' Under
the new ordinances, no adult businesses could be located within
1,000 feet of any two existing adult businesses or within 500 feet of
any residential area." The Supreme Court found that the zoning
requirements were passed, not to silence offensive expression, but
to prevent the deterioration of neighborhoods. 1 The city's finding
65. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
66. Young, 427 U.S. at 58-63.
67. Id. at 62-63.
68. Id. at 63, 71 n. 34.
69. Id. at 52-54.
70. Id at 52. This disbursement method is one approach municipalities have used to
restrict adult entertainment uses.
71. Young, 427 U.S. at 62-63. Justice Stevens stated:
In the opinion of urban planners and real estate experts who supported
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that adult uses of property, when concentrated in limited areas,
had a "deleterious effect on the adjacent areas" and could "con-
tribute to the blighting or downgrading of the surrounding neigh-
borhood" supported the legislative purpose.' In the Court's plural-
ity opinion, Justice Stevens characterized this interest as a harmful
secondary effect.
73
In the words of Justice Stevens, "the city's interest in attempting
to preserve the quality of urban life is one that must be accorded
high respect."4 Justice Stevens relied heavily on the fact that the
zoning regulation was passed in response to "secondary effects,"
relating to the decline of property values and increase in crime
rate, rather than in response to the content of the films that were
shown. 7
This secondary effect rationale, however, has generated heavy
criticism.' First Amendment commentators have noted that the
"secondary effects" doctrine is applicable for most restrictions on
speech.7 For instance, a blanket ban on speech criticizing the gov-
ernment may be substantiated as an attempt to promote a more
efficient and economical government. Such prohibitions would be
freed from strict scrutiny via the secondary effects doctrine.79
Several years after Young, in Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thomp-
son,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit at-
tempted to limit Young by requiring some semblance of a fact-
the ordinances, the location of several such businesses [adult theaters and
other regulated businesses] in the same neighborhood tends to attract an
undesirable quantity and quality of transients, adversely effects property
values, causes an increase in crime, especially prostitution, and encour-
ages residents and businesses to move elsewhere.
Id. at 55.
72. Id. at 54 n.6.
73. Id. at 71 n.34. Justice Stevens supported this conclusion, noting as follows:
The Common Council's determination was that a concentration of 'adult'
movie theaters causes the area to deteriorate and become a focus of
crime, effects which were not attributable to theaters showing other types
of films. It is this secondary effect which these zoning ordinances attempt




76. Kimberly K Smith, Zoning Adult Entertainment: A Reassessment of Renton, 79
CALIF. L. REv. 119, 128 (1991).
77. Smith, 79 CALIF. L. REV. at 128.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 667 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1981).
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finding effort by government officials before the court would use
the secondary effects rationale.8' The ordinance in Avalon Cinema
Corp. prohibited the location of adult motion picture theaters
within 100 yards of a church, public or private elementary school,
area restricted to residential use, or park.' The court invalidated
this city zoning law, finding that it had been passed by the North
Little Rock, Arkansas, city council only after an adult business re-
ceived a permit and license to operate an adult bookstore and an
adult movie theater.'
Judge Arnold, writing for the Eighth Circuit, distinguished the
North Little Rock ordinance from the Detroit zoning ordinance in
Young on the grounds that the North Little Rock zoning law was
based on neither studies conducted by social scientists nor a dem-
onstrated past history of adult theaters causing neighborhood de-
terioration.' In contrast to the empirical evidence in Young, the
only finding made in Avalon Cinema Corp. was that "[t]he City
Council... found and determined that the prohibition of certain
sexually explicit films in specific areas of the city is immediately
necessary and desirable to insure and safeguard the proper devel-
opment of young people and adults alike within the City of North
Little Rock... ."' In response to this purported justification by the
city, the circuit court noted that "[t]his 'finding' is little more than a
statement that the City Council thinks that a certain kind of pro-
tected speech is morally objectionable. Such a purpose, however
defensible on moral grounds cannot, under the First Amendment,
be the basis for restricting protected speech."' The court deter-
mined that the lack of proof of any secondary effects demon-
strated that the ordinance was a hostile reaction to the form of
expression and, therefore, held the content-based ordinance un-
constitutional.87
In Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,' a seven-member majority
of the Supreme Court significantly expanded a city's power to sin-
gle out adult businesses through its zoning laws without violating
81. Avalon Cinema Corp., 667 F.2d at 661-62.
82. Id. at 660 n.3.
83. Id. at 660-61.
84. Id. at 661.
85. Id. at 661 n. 6.
86. Avalon Cinema Corp., 667 F.2d at 661.
87. Id. at 661-63.
88. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
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the constraints imposed by the First Amendment.' There, the
plaintiffs, who had purchased two theaters within a proscribed
area with the intent to exhibit adult films, sought declaratory' and
injunctive 9' relief against enforcement of an ordinance that pro-
vided that adult theaters could not be located within 1,000 feet of
any residential zone, single or multiple family dwelling, church,
park, or school.92
The Court held that ordinances that merely restrict the location
of adult theaters without banning them altogether are content neu-
tral and should be evaluated as "time, place, and manner" regula-
tions for purposes of determining their validity under the First
Amendment. 3 The Court opined that a permissible time, place, and
manner restriction is one that is justified by a substantial govern-
mental interest unrelated to free speech and that allows for ade-
quate alternative avenues of communication of sexually explicit
material.' Following its broad holding in Young, the Court held
that the ordinance in question did not ban adult theaters altogether
and was, therefore, a proper time, place, and manner regulation. 5
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington initially determined that the predominant intent of the
ordinance was to mitigate the secondary effects of adult theaters,
not to regulate their content.' On appeal, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that if a "motivating factor" in enacting the
ordinance was the restriction of speech, the ordinance will be held
invalid. 7 The Supreme Court held that the existence of a valid pre-
dominant intent was adequate to establish that the city's zoning
89. Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52 (explaining that the city is not required to perform its
own studies regarding secondary harmful effects, as was required by the Eighth Circuit
in Avalon).
90. "In a case or actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court of the United
States, on the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal
relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief
is or could be sought." 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994).
91. Injunctive relief is "[a] court order prohibiting someone from doing some speci-
fied act or commanding someone to undo some wrong or injury." BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 784 (6th ed. 1990); FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
92. Renton, 475 U.S. at 44-45.
93. Id. at 54. Some courts have determined an ordinance is not content neutral if an
improper intent or purpose has been established. Avalon, 667 F.2d at 661-63.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 46.
96. Id. (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., No. 83-3980; No. 83-3805).
97. Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 748 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1984).
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efforts were unrelated to the suppression of free expression." The
Court relied on the stated purposes of the ordinance, which were
the protection of retail trade, the prevention of crime, the mainte-
nance of property values, and the preservation of the quality of
neighborhood commercial districts and urban life.' The Court held
that such a mixed motive was insufficient to invalidate an other-
wise valid restriction, so long as the predominant concern of the
zoning regulation was legitimate."0
Although no adult uses existed in the city at the time the Renton
ordinance was proposed, the city planning committee held public
hearings and reviewed the secondary effects of adult uses in other
cities, such as Seattle and Detroit, before enacting the ordinance.''
The Court held that, in enacting ordinances that restrict the loca-
tion of adult uses, a city need not conduct its own studies regard-
ing the secondary effects of adult businesses to establish the requi-
site substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression
of free speech."° The Court, in Renton, concluded that the First
Amendment does not require that a city conduct new studies or
produce evidence independent of that already generated by other
cities before enacting an ordinance, so long as whatever evidence
the city relies on is reasonably believed to be relevant to the prob-
lem that the city addresses."
In addition, the Court determined that the ordinance was nar-
rowly tailored to affect only that category of theaters shown to
produce "unwanted secondary effects."" The Court found that
cities may regulate adult theaters by dispersing them or by concen-
trating them and must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to ex-
98. Renton, 475 U.S. at 48.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 47-48.
101. Id. at 51. The city planning committee relied on the experiences of Detroit, as
discussed in Young. Id.
102. Id. at 51-52.
103. Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan wrote a
dissenting opinion in which Justice Marshall joined. Id. at 55. Justice Brennan argued
that the law selectively imposed limitations on the location of a movie theater based
exclusively on the content of the films shown there. Id. He persuasively pointed out
that, although adult theaters may cause harmful secondary effects, this does not make
the zoning ordinance content neutral. Id. at 56. He noted that the purported secondary
effects were mentioned by Renton city leaders after the lawsuit was filed. Id. at 59.
Justice Brennan stated, "[p]rior to the amendment, there was no indication that the
ordinance was designed to address any secondary effects a single adult theater might
create. In addition to the suspiciously coincidental timing of the amendment, many of
the City Council's findings do not relate to legitimate land-use concerns." Id.
104. Id. at 52-53.
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periment with ways to combat the secondary effects of adult busi-
nesses. ' The Court also noted that the ordinance allowed for rea-
sonable alternative channels for sexually explicit
communication."° Specifically, the ordinance did not unreasonably
limit alternative avenues of communication because 520 acres, or
greater than five percent of the city's land, was left open for the
establishment of adult theaters.1 17 The Court stated that the city
need only refrain from, in effect, prohibiting proprietors of adult
theaters a reasonable chance to locate and function an adult thea-
ter within the city.'"
Thus, the current status of the law, after Renton, is that an adult
use zoning regulation will be upheld if it is designed to serve the
substantial governmental interest of preventing harmful secondary
effects and it allows for reasonable alternative avenues of commu-
nication." However, the supporting evidence of harmful secon-
dary effects need not come from the municipality's own studies or
experts.
110
One possible danger of the Renton holding is that even the most
tranquil of communities could create a barrier against adult enter-
tainment based on empirical evidence gathered in far distant cities.
Unfortunately, this may create new First Amendment concerns,
such as the necessity of presenting independent evidence of harm-
ful secondary effects and the necessity of presenting pre-
enactment evidence of such harmful secondary effects.
I. POTENTIAL FIRST AMENDMENT IssuEs REGARDING
EVIDENCE OF HARMFUL SECONDARY EFFECTS
A. The Necessity of Presenting Independent Evidence of
Harmful Secondary Effects
Both lawyers and municipal officers need to be aware of First
Amendment issues on the horizon that will shape the law in this
area. In Renton, the most recent statement of the law regarding
zoning restrictions on adult entertainment, the Supreme Court
105. Id. at 52.
106. Id. at 53-54.
107. Id. at 53.
108. Renton, 475 U.S. at 54.
109. Id. at 50.
110. Id. at 51-52.
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held that a city need not conduct its own studies regarding the
secondary effects of adult businesses; a city's mere reliance on the
experiences and studies of other cities is deemed sufficient to
demonstrate that adult businesses can have harmful effects on the
city's own community."' It is possible, however, that this portion
of the Renton holding may be overturned in the near future.
The Supreme Court, in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,"2
recently struck down a Rhode Island statute that prohibited retail
pricing information in alcoholic beverage advertisements."3 In 44
Liquormart, the Court reconsidered the application of the long-
standing test for determining the validity of a government regula-
tion concerning commercial speech, a test virtually identical to the
test applicable to time, place, and manner regulations of noncom-
mercial speech, which was approved under Renton."4
Under Renton and its progeny, the Court has long held that
courts are to defer to legislative judgment regarding the substanti-
ality of the governmental interest and whether the regulation was
narrowly tailored to serve those interests."5 However, in 44 Liq-
uormart, the Court suggested that it would "carefully examine" the
substantiality of a governmental interest and the evidence relied
on by the government to establish that the regulation substantially
advances that interest."6
Given the holding in 44 Liquormart, it may be that a locality will
have to do more in the future than merely rely on experiences and
studies from other cities. Plainly, the enactment of a zoning ordi-
nance supported solely by the concern of residents and public of-
ficials pertaining to the location of adult businesses in their com-
111. Id.
112. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
113. Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 489. This action arose out of an advertisement placed by
44 Liquormart in a Rhode Island newspaper in 1991. Id. at 492. The advertisement did
not state the price of any alcoholic beverages because state law prohibited advertising
liquor prices. Id. "The ad did, however, state the prices at which peanuts, potato chips,
and Schwepps mixers were being offered, identify various brands of packaged liquor,
and include the word 'WOW' in large letters next to pictures of vodka and rum bottles."
Id.
114. Id. at 494-95.
115. See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tours and Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328
(1986). In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court upheld a Puerto Rican law that
prohibited the advertising of casino gambling aimed at residents of Puerto Rico but
permitted such advertising aimed at tourists. Id. The Court accepted, without further
inquiry, Puerto Rico's assertions that the regulations furthered the government's interest
and were no more extensive than was necessary to serve that interest. Id.
116. Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 494-95.
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munity would fail to withstand this type of searching scrutiny.
It can be argued that Renton has been partially overruled by 44
Liquormart, which requires independent studies and experiences
to establish harmful secondary effects. Adult entertainment uses
can be damaging in a variety of ways to a municipality. Although
there may be several tools that local governments can utilize in
their attempt to eliminate the problems associated with the adult
entertainment industry, it seems clear that the appropriate use of
local zoning and land use powers provides the most effective re-
lief-especially when coupled with detailed studies concerning the
secondary effects of such uses. State and local governments may
need to produce independent evidence of these harmful secondary
effects in an effort to establish the requisite "substantial govern-
mental interest." This independent evidence may consist of expert
opinions, such as police officer testimony regarding the effects on
criminal activity, and real estate appraisals regarding the deteriora-
tion of neighborhoods and/or the decrease in property values.
B. The Necessity of Presenting Pre-Enactment Evidence of
Harmful Secondary Effects
In response to First Amendment attacks on adult entertainment
ordinances, state and local governments have typically attempted
to amend invalid ordinances in response to litigation. Lawyers and
municipal officers must be aware that, in light of recent case law,
they may need to present pre-enactment evidence of harmful sec-
ondary effects.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in
Phillips v. Borough of Keyport,"7 recently upheld a government
regulation affecting speech, despite the fact that the adopting en-
tity did not have before it, at the time of adoption, evidence of
harmful secondary effects of the regulated speech."8 The court
noted that "a significant difference exists between the requirement
that there be a factual basis for a legislative judgment presented in
court when that judgment was challenged, and a requirement that
such a factual basis have been submitted to the legislative body
117. 107 F.3d 164 (3d Cir. 1997).
118. Phillips, 107 F.3d at 178-79.
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prior to the enactment of the legislative measure." 9
In effect, the Phillips approach allows for a legislative body to
enact a zoning ordinance without proof of harmful secondary ef-
fects, in direct violation of the principles established in Young and
Renton. The circuit court, in Phillips, essentially allowed legisla-
tures to establish evidence of harmful secondary effects after the
enactment of the ordinance. This "post-enactment" finding of sec-
ondary effects directly contravenes earlier precedent and may ul-
timately be overruled.
Judge Rosenn, in a persuasive dissenting opinion in Phillips,
held that "the Borough of Keyport's failure to articulate at the time
of enactment any governmental interest justifying its Ordinance
No. 31-92, designed to curb protected speech expression, is a fatal
constitutional defect."2 ' He continued by stating that "[t]he defect
cannot be cured by allowing the municipality to structure a post
hoc record more than four years later, and then after judicial re-
view by a trial and appellate court."2'
Judge Rosenn reiterated how courts have sought to reconcile
"respect for local land regulation concerns with the protection of
speech by requiring that municipalities impose restraints on adult
entertainment establishments only where there is evidence that
they have deleterious 'secondary effects' on adjacent areas."22 Al-
though the majority allowed the development of evidence at any
time after the zoning regulation was enacted but before it was
challenged in court, Judge Rosenn concluded that "this runs coun-
ter to the protective purpose of such an evidentiary requirement,
which is the view taken by the Supreme Court in City ofRenton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., and by virtually every other circuit in this
country. iln
119. Id. at 178.
120. Id. at 187 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
121. Id. Judge Rosenn continued:
Although I fully empathize with the efforts of the Borough of Keyport to
preserve a wholesome quality of community life, I cannot lend my support
to the majority's potentially dangerous disregard of an established safe-
guard in protection of cherished First Amendment rights, namely, a record
at the time of enactment justifying the restrictive regulation of protected
speech.
Id. at 188.
122. Id. (citing Young, 427 U.S. at 50, 70).
123. Phillips, 107 F.3d at 188. The Phillips Court noted as follows:
Renton stands only for the proposition that a municipality need not con-
duct its own pre-enactment studies (i.e., that it may rely on studies con-
ducted by other communities). The unavoidable inference from Renton is
that the municipality must rely on something at the time of enactment jus-
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Judge Rosenn noted that no other court of appeals has inter-
preted Renton to require absolutely no pre-enactment evidence.'24
The position adopted by the majority leaves the Third Circuit an
outcast among the United States courts of appeals. The Renton
Court left no doubt that pre-enactment evidence of harmful secon-
dary effects is indeed a constitutional requirement; the Court sus-
tained the ordinance in question because it was satisfied that the
enacting body had sufficient pre-enactment evidence before it.' 5
Similar cases have been decided by the First, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.2 ' "Each of
these circuits has interpreted Renton to require pre-enactment
evidence of harmful secondary effects, and each of these circuits
has insisted on such evidence before affirming the constitutional-
ity of a restrictive zoning ordinance.' 27 Although the Phillips ma-
jority, by allowing "post-enactment" findings of secondary effects,
directly contravenes earlier precedent, state and local govern-
ments continue to rely on Phillips in an effort to ban adult enter-
tainment without performing the potentially difficult task of de-
termining whether harmful secondary effects really exist. This,
however, is a dangerous approach because it allows legislatures to
amend invalid ordinances in response to litigation, without first
finding sufficient facts to support such ordinances.
It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court in United States v. Vir-
ginia,'- similar to the dissent in Philips, suggested that the state
must show that the justification for the legislation is genuine, not
tifying its action limiting freedom of speech.
Id. The Renton Court, itself, specifically stated
The First Amendment does not require a city, before enacting such an or-
dinance, to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that
already generated by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city
relies on is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city
addresses.
Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 189. (citing Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52).
126. See National Amusements, Inc. v. Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 742 (1st Cir. 1995); 11126
Baltimore Blvd. v. Prince George's County, 886 F.2d 1415, 1421-23 (4th Cir. 1989); SDJ,
Inc. v. Houston, 837 F.2d 1268, 1274 (5th Cir. 1988); Christy v. Ann Arbor, 824 F.2d 489,
493 (6th Cir. 1987); Berg v. Health & Hosp. Corp., 865 F.2d 797, 803-04 (7th Cir. 1989);
Postscript Enter. v. Bridgeton, 905 F.2d 223, 227 (8th Cir. 1990); Tollis Inc. v. San
Bernardino County, 827 F.2d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1987); International Eateries of Amer-
ica, Inc. v. Broward County, 941 F.2d 1157, 1163 (11th Cir. 1991).
127. Phillips, 107 F.3d at 190.
128. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation. '29 Al-
though Virginia dealt with gender-based education, the interme-
diate standard of review applied in that case was identical to that
afforded to adult entertainment." It can be argued that the ration-
ale of Virginia requires proof of harmful secondary effects to be
presented before litigation. Lawyers and municipal officials may
not be able to establish a substantial governmental interest in re-
sponse to litigation post hoc and should be wary of doing so.
CONCLUSION
Many forms of adult entertainment, unlike obscenity, are af-
forded protection under the First Amendment. Because of this pro-
tection, laws that regulate adult entertainment must be prudently
drafted so as not to violate rights guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment. Specifically, drafters of adult entertainment licensing regula-
tions must impose adequate standards for officials to apply in ren-
dering a decision. In addition, the licensing regulations should im-
pose procedural safeguards sufficient to ensure a prompt decision.
It is also recommended that proposed zoning ordinances that seek
to regulate adult entertainment be aimed at serving a substantial
governmental interest, namely the existence of harmful secondary
effects.
Both lawyers and municipal officials should devote the time
necessary to understand how these regulations may impinge on
First Amendment rights. In addition, both lawyers and municipal
officials should be aware that the courts may, in the future, impose
a requirement that state and local governments present independ-
ent evidence of harmful secondary effects and a requirement that
129. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533. The United States sued the Commonwealth of Virginia
alleging an equal protection violation in maintaining a military college exclusively for
males. Id. at 516. The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia
entered judgment for the commonwealth, in United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia,
766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991). On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals va-
cated the district court's judgment and remanded the case back to the district court,
United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992). The district
court then approved the commonwealth's proposed remedial plan. United States v.
Commonwealth of Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994). Justice Ginsburg, writing
for the Court, held that the commonwealth failed to show exceedingly persuasive justifi-
cation for excluding women from a citizen-soldier program offered at a Virginia military
college in violation of equal protection. Virginia, 518 U.S. 516.
130. Id. at 531.
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they present pre-enactment evidence of such harmful secondary
effects. The guidelines discussed throughout this comment should
be carefully considered by all those involved in the regulation of
adult entertainment, so as to avoid potential infringement on First
Amendment rights.
Brian M. Silver
